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This article discusses first the heavy impact of dissension in a
close corporation and the injustices and hardships which minority
shareholders in that type of business organization often suffer." It
then examines remedies available in this country to unhappy or
aggrieved shareholders. Finally, it looks at some of the remedies
open to oppressed shareholders in British companies, especially at a
provision in the Companies Act of 1948 designed to enlarge the
protection afforded minorities and at the interesting decisions which
have been handed down under that provision.
PRO13LEMS OF STRIFE AND OPPRESSION
(A) Inability of Unhappy Shareholder To Get Out. In a close
corporation, the relationship among the participants, like that among
partners, presupposes close co-operation and a high degree of good
faith and mutual respect. Ordinarily all or most of the shareholders
are active in the business and they are in constant contact with each
other. Once dissatisfaction or distrust has developed, friction is
likely to continue to grow. Strife in turn often breeds oppression;
and indeed in the mind of an unhappy shareholder there is often no
clear-cut line between dissension and unpleasantness on the one hand
and oppression and injustices on the other.
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An unhappy shareholder in a close corporation often cannot get
out of the enterprise without serious loss. All or a large part of his
assets may be tied up in the business, and the salary he receives from
the company may furnish his principal livelihood. He ordinarily does
not have a partner's power to dissolve the business unit; and, unlike
the shareholder in a public-issue corporation, he cannot dispose of his
stock easily. Anything less than a controlling interest in a close
corporation does not have a ready market; and, if there is dissension,
a minority interest is even less inviting to prospective purchasers.
Further, if there are restrictions on the transferability of the cor-
poration's shares, as is often the case, irritated and obstinate as-
sociates can prevent a sale.
(B) Losses to Enterprise and to Participants. Whenever a dis-
satisfied shareholder in a close corporation cannot dispose of his shares
without heavy financial sacrifice, serious harm to the enterprise and
heavy losses to the shareholders often follow. The shareholder's
services may be necessary for the efficient. operation of the business or
he may be frozen into the directorate or an officership by a share-
holders' agreement or other control arrangement; but, in exaspera-
tion, he may consistently refuse to cooperate with his associates and
in fact do whatever he can to obstruct the operation of the corpora-
tion's affairs. Unhappiness and strife among participants not uncom-
monly result in litigation and much unfavorable publicity, and some-
times even in physical violence.
(C) Deadlocks. The distribution of voting shares in a close
corporation is often such that an eventual impasse is probable. In
some instances, the shares are evenly divided between two share-
holders or groups of shareholders. Wherever directorates have an
even number of members-not an uncommon occurrence-even divi-
sions among the directors are likely to occur. Further, persons who
are to hold minority interests in closely held enterprises, in an effort
to protect themselves against the power normally vested in a majority
of the shareholders and their directors to determine corporate policy
and to make decisions by simple majority vote, often bargain for and
obtain a veto over corporate policies and decisions. Veto powers of
course greatly enhance the risk of eventual corporate paralysis. In the
colorful language of a Virginia court,2 veto arrangements empower a
recalcit raht shareholder or director to "embalm his corporation and
hold it helpless . . . in a state of suspended animation."
(D) Squeeze Outs. On the other hand, whenever control is not
evenly divided in a close corporation and minority shareholders do
not have a veto over corporate decisions, majority shareholders and
2 Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 893, 896-97 (1944).
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the directors and officers whom they control often try to squeeze out
the minority shareholders or some of them. A "squeeze out" is a
manipulative use of corporate control to eliminate minority share-
holders from an enterprise, reduce their voting power or claims on
corporate earnings and assets, or otherwise deprive them of corporate
income or advantages.
A squeeze out may take any one of a number of forms. Majority
shareholders may cause the corporation to sell its assets at an inade-
quate price to the majority shareholders or to companies in which the
majority are interested; 3 they may organize a new company in which
the minority will have no interest, transfer the corporation's assets or
business to it, and perhaps then dissolve the old corporation; 4 they
may bring about the merger or consolidation of the corporation under
a plan unfair to the minority;-' they may drain off the corporation's
earnings in the form of exorbitant salaries and bonuses to the major-
ity shareholder-officers and perhaps to their relatives, or in the form
of high rent by the corporation for property leased from majority
shareholders or unreasonable payments by the corporation under con-
tracts between the corporation and majority shareholders not arrived
at in arm's length dealings.
In recent years, a squeeze out has perhaps most often taken one
of the two following forms: (1) the shareholder-director-executives
refuse to declare dividends but they provide high compensation for
themselves and otherwise enjoy to the fullest the "patronage" which
corporate control entails, leaving minority shareholders who do not
hold corporate office with the choice of getting little or no return on
their investments for an indefinite period of time or of selling out to
the majority shareholders at whatever price they will offer; 6 or (2)
the shareholder-director-executives cause the corporation to issue a
large number of new shares, which they themselves take at grossly
inadequate price, thus increasing their proportionate control and
claims on earnings and assets and diluting the interests of the minor-
ity7 (if minority shareholders have pre-emptive rights, the issue will
be made at a time when the minority shareholders are not in a position
to finance the acquisition of their part of the issue).8
3 See, e.g., Ervin v. Oregon Railway & Navigation Co., 27 Fed. 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1886).
4 See, e.g., Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120
At. 486 (Ch. 1923); Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 Pac. 1004
(1904).
G See, e.g., Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765 (8th Cir. 1906).
6 See Von Au v. Magenheimer, 126 App. Div. 257, 110 N.Y. Supp. 629 (2d Dep't
1908), aff'd, 196 N.Y. 510, 89 N.E. 1114 (1909).
7 See Hammer v. Werner, 239 App. Div. 38, 265 N.Y. Supp. 172 (2d Dep't 1933).
8 For a detailed discussion of squeeze-out techniques, see Comment, 1959 Duke L.J.
436. See also note, 35 N.C.L. Rev. 271 (1957).
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(E) Losses to the Economy. There is no way of knowing the
extent of the economic loss resulting from the failure of our laws to
assure fair treatment to minority interests in close corporations and to
provide effective ways of settling disputes in such companies. Cer-
tainly, the frequency of squeeze outs and deadlocks has become well
known to prospective investors; undoubtedly, many persons, because
of the dangers of oppression or deadlock in a close corporation, choose
to purchase shares in public-issue corporations or even permit their
accumulated funds to remain idle rather than risk the purchase of a
minority interest in a closely held enterprise. Thus potential sources
of much-needed risk capital for small business enterprises are
squandered.
REMEDIES IN THE UNITED STATES
(A) Principles Which Obstruct Relief. Barriers to relief for
aggrieved or unhappy shareholders include (1) the principle of ma-
jority control, (2) the business judgment rule, and (3) the reluctance
of some courts to permit departures from the traditional pattern of
corporation management.
In the absence of some special control arrangement, a corporation
is subject to the principle of majority rule: holders of a majority of
voting shares govern. "The very foundation principle of a corpora-
tion," commented a Georgia judge many years ago, "is that the ma-
jority of its stockholders have the right to manage its affairs, so long
as they keep within their chartered rights."9
Majority shareholders elect the directors, even under cumulative
voting over half of them. The directors in turn select officers and
employees, fix their compensation, determine business policies, and
manage the business. Whatever voice a minority shareholder has is
purely at the grace or acquiescence of the majority.
Majority rule is modified in most states by statutory provisions
requiring for fundamental corporate acts, such as charter amend-
ments, mergers or consolidations, or sale of substantially all corporate
assets, the favorable vote of holders of two-thirds or three-fourths of
the shares with voting power or the vote of the holders of a specified
percentage of all shares irrespective of whether the shares are given
voting rights by the charter. Statutes of this kind give sizeable minor-
ities protection against some of the cruder and more direct squeeze-out
techniques, but of course do nothing to relieve a shareholder's dis-
satisfaction with the way the majority is conducting corporate affairs.
The business judgment rule gives a large discretion to the direc-
tors to determine business policy and to conduct corporate affairs. As
9 Hand v. Dexter, 41 Ga. 454, 462 (1871).
OPPUGNANCY AND OPPRESSION IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS
the late Professor Ballantine has pointed out,"° courts "hesitate to
substitute their judgment on complicated questions of business policy
for that of the elected managers of the business and have limited the
scope of judicial review which they are willing to undertake." This
means that in general they will not review directors' decisions in select-
ing corporate officers and employees, fixing salaries, authorizing con-
tracts, and determining business policies and the course of corporate
affairs.
Persons acquiring a minority interest in a closely held enterprise
often seek by arrangements made in advance to protect themselves
against the tremendous powers the principle of majority control and
the business judgment rule vest in majority shareholders and the
directors they select. Lawyers representing minority interests some-
times show great resourcefulness and ingenuity in setting up arrange-
ments to protect their clients: pre-incorporation agreements, special
charter and by-law clauses, shareholders' contracts of various kinds,
voting trusts, irrevocable proxies, and long-term employment con-
tracts. That intriguing story of imaginative corporate practitioners,
complex legal instruments, and ingenious solutions to planning and
drafting problems has been told elsewhere; 11 it will not be repeated
here. For present purposes, it suffices to say, some courts even now
will upset on one ground or another a special charter or by-law provi-
sion or a contractual arrangement which departs from the principle
of majority rule or sets up a control pattern different from the ortho-
dox scheme of corporation management.
Judges and legislators, no less than other men, are creatures of
their culture: its ideas are their ideas, its methods their methods, its
limitations their limitations. Small wonder that a legal generation
which grew up in an atmosphere of corporate theory pervaded with
the "concession theory" of corporate existence, under which the cor-
poration is viewed as an artificial, fictitious being, and a corporate
charter as a grant from the sovereign giving "life" to a new legal
entity,-small wonder that such a generation is slow to approve un-
orthodox arrangements among shareholders which imply that a cor-
poration is simply a group of businessmen voluntarily associating
together, with freedom within broad bounds to determine by contract
their relations among themselves.
(B) Remedies in General. An unhappy shareholder can of course
10 Ballantine, Corporations § 231 (Rev. ed. 1946).
11 E.g., O'Neal, Close Corporations: Law and Practice chs. IIl-VHI, IX (1958);
Hoban, Voting Control Methods, 1958 U. Ill. L. Forum 110; Logan, Methods to Con-
trol the Closely Held Kansas Corporation, 7 Kan. L. Rev. 405 (1959); Powers, Cross
Fire on the Close Corporation: Norms Versus Needs, 11 U. Fla. L. Rev. 433 (1958);
Scott, The Close Corporation in Contemporary Business, 13 Bus. Law. 741, 748-752
(1958).
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harass those in control of a corporation by exercising his right to
inspect corporate books and records. If he has the pocketbook and
stomach for tough, long-drawn-out litigation and can overcome the
rather numerous obstacles to a shareholder's derivative suit (the
rule requiring demands on directors and shareholders before suit, the
contemporaneous ownership rule, minimum share requirements, and
security-for-expense statutes), he can bring an action on behalf of
the corporation for wrongs supposedly committed against it. Some
of the magic words on which such a suit might be based are "fraud,"
"waste of assets," "spoliation," and "pre-emption of corporate op-
portunity."'-2 By instituting litigation of this kind, a minority share-
holder might be able to obtain for the corporation redress for past
wrongs committed, or he might be able to exact concessions in respect
to future conduct of the business in return for his discontinuing the
litigation.
If majority shareholders try to squeeze minority holders through
the issuance of additional shares of the corporation's stock, minority
shareholders may find their pre-emptive rights, if those rights have
not been taken away by statute or charter provision, some slight
comfort but hardly real protection against persistent and sophisticated
squeeze-plays. If the squeeze technique utilized is merger or con-
solidation, an informed minority shareholder can assert his statutory
right to have his interest appraised and to receive cash for it; in some
jurisdictions he also has appraisal rights if the majority causes the
corporation to sell all or substantially all its assets.
If a shareholder is induced to sell his shares to majority interests
or to the corporation through misrepresentations or "half truths," he
may be able to rescind the sale or to affirm the sale and recover
damages for deceit.13 If the purchaser merely withholds information,
making no statement which is false or which can be construed as a
half-truth, the selling shareholder may be able to obtain relief in
some jurisdictions on the theory that the purchaser has breached a
fiduciary duty to the seller, a duty which requires the disclosure of
all officially-obtained information which affects the value of the
stock;"4 in the presence of "special facts" or "special circumstances"
12 For a discussion of the doctrine of corporate opportunity, see Carrington and Mc-
Elroy, The Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity, 14 Bus. Law. 957 (1959); Scott, The
Close Corporation in Contemporary Business, 13 Bus. Law. 741, 754-56 (1958).
13 For a discussion of the various theories on which a selling shareholder may pro-
ceed when he has been induced to sell his shares by misrepresentation, see Barnes v.
Eastern & Western Lumber Co., 205 Ore. 553, 287 P.2d 929, 948 (1955). For a purchaser's
liability for "half truths," see Restatement, Torts § 529, Comment a; Prosser, Torts 534
(2d ed. 1955).
14 Blazer v. Block, 196 F.2d 139, 146 (10th Cir. 1952); Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362,
45 S.E. 232 (1903) ; Humphrey v. Baron, 223 Iowa 735, 273 N;W. 856 (1937) ; Hotchkiss
v. Fisher, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932).
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a duty to disclose arises in still other jurisdictions;15 and in the
absence of remedy under state law and perhaps in preference to it
even where available, a shareholder may find remedies under the
Federal Securities Act of 1933, the Federal Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, and rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission imple-
menting those statutes.'0
(C) Expanding Conception of Fiduciary Duties of Directors
and Controlling Shareholders. In the past, some courts have permitted
majority shareholders and the directors to exercise almost without
restriction the powers they have under the statutes and the corpora-
tion's charter and by-laws; 1T they have even treated the fiduciary
duties of the directors as running only in favor of the corporation, not
to the minority shareholders.' 8 This view that the controlling share-
holders and the directors do not owe fiduciary duties to minority
shareholders is outmoded, at least as applied to squeeze outs and
other attempts to deprive minority shareholders of their proportionate
rights without a just equivalent. Where several owners carry on an
enterprise together (as they usually do in a close corporation), their
relationship should be considered a fiduciary one 9 similar to the rela-
tionship among partners. The fact that the enterprise is incorporated
should not substantially change the picture. True it is, that when
businessmen organize a corporation they enter into their relationship
against a background of corporation statutes and common law doc-
trine which vest in the directors the power to manage the corporation's
affairs and in the directors and specified percentages of the share-
holders power to effect fundamental corporate acts, such as the sale of
all the corporation's assets or reorganization of the corporation through
merger or consolidation. That does not mean, however, that the
directors or the majority shareholders should be permitted to exercise
their powers arbitrarily or without regard to the legitimate expecta-
15 Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 In. App. 223,
63 N.E.2d 630 (1945); Nichol v. Sensenbrenner, 220 Wis. 165, 263 N.W. 650 (1935).
16 See Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corpora-
tion under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 505 (1953). For an outline
(prepared for British readers) of the protection afforded minority shareholders by Ameri-
can law, see Latty, Minority Shareholder Protection in American Corporation Law,
1957 J. Bus. L. 110, 224, 337.
17 See Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del.), aff'd, 146
F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253,
262 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Ballantine, Corporations § 278 (1946); cf. Bodell v. General Gas
& Electric Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 420, 140 Atl. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1927), sustaining discretion
of the directors in selling no par stock at less than market value.
is Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868); Stevens, Corpora-
tions § 150 (2d ed. 1949).
19 See Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145-
46 (1932).
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tions of the minority shareholders.2 0
Many of the older decisions 21 and practically all of the recent
ones indicate that controlling shareholders, in some circumstances
at least, owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders and that the
courts will require them (whether they act in their capacity as share-
holders or through directors or officers whom they control) to ob-
serve accepted standards of business ethics in transactions affecting
rights of minority shareholders. In view of the informal way in
which the affairs of most close corporations are conducted, there
is usually no necessity for distinguishing between the fiduciary duties
of the controlling participants in their various capacities as share-
holders, directors, and officers. As was said by the Court of Appeals
of New York,2 3 whenever a number of stockholders "constitute them-
selves, or are by the law constituted, the managers of corporate affairs
or interests, they stand in much the same attitude towards the other
or minority stockholders that the directors sustain generally towards
all the stockholders, and the law requires of them the utmost good
faith," and a court of equity "will protect a minority stockholder
against the acts or threatened acts of the board of directors or of
the managing stockholders of the corporation, which violate the fidu-
ciary relation and are directly injurious to the stockholders." 4 And,
as a federal court has said,2" majority shareholders "owe to the
minority the duty to exercise good faith, care, and diligence to make
the property of the corporation in their charge produce the largest
20 In Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919), Mr. Justice
Brandeis, speaking for the court, in referring to the principle that majority shareholders
rule, commented as follows: "The majority has the right to control; but when it does
so, it occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much as the corporation itself
or its officers and directors."
21 Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Min. Co., 221 Fed. 529 (6th Cir. 1915); Ervin v.
Oregon Railway & Navigation Co., 27 Fed. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1886); Allied Chemical &
Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 Atl. 486, 491 (Ch. 1923); Kavanaugh
v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148, 151-52 (1919).
22 See, e.g., Funk v. Spalding, 74 Ariz. 219, 246 P.2d 184 (1952) (shareholder who
took over management of close corporation on departure of other shareholder for
military service owes the absent shareholder a fiduciary duty to account for profits,
and absent shareholder can maintain in his own right action based on fiduciary rela-
tion); Eisbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d 354, 136 P.2d 651 (1943); Bennet v.
Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953); Mendelsohn v. Leather Mfg.
Co., 326 Mass. 226, 93 N.E.2d 537 (1950); Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 340, 67
S.E.2d 350 (1951); Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 331, 67 S.E.2d 355 (1951);
Meadows v. Bradshaw-Diehl, 139 W. Va. 569, 81 S.E.2d 63 (1954); Steven v. Hale-
Haas Corp., 249 Wis. 205, 23 N.Y.2d 620 (1946).
23 Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148, 151-52
(1919).
24 Compare language in Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steele & Tube Co., 14
Del. Ch. 1, 120 Adt. 486, 491 (1923).
25 Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765, 771 (Sth Cir. 1906). See
also Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 340, 67 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1951).
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possible amount, to protect the interests of the holders of the minority
of the stock and to secure and deliver to them their just proportion
of the income and of the proceeds of the property. Any sale of the
corporate property to themselves, any disposition by them of the
corporation or of its property to deprive the minority holders of their
just share of it or to get gain for themselves at the expense of the
holders of the minority of the stock, becomes a breach of duty and of
trust which invokes plenary relief from a court of chancery."
(D) Power of Minority Shareholders To Compel the Declaration
of Dividends. If a minority shareholder in a close corporation is not
an officer or principal employee, he is of course vitally interested in
seeing that the corporation makes profits and (aside from tax consid-
erations in some instances) that the corporation distributes the profits
in the form of dividends as rapidly as is consistent with the safety of
the business and its future profit-making position. On the other hand,
the directors of the corporation (usually the principal shareholders or
the holders of a controlling interest) may not want to "show" a profit;
or, even if the corporation's books show a large fund legally available
for dividends, they may not be willing to declare dividends.
The directors may prefer to plow the earnings back into the
business in order to increase its size and thus enhance their own
prestige and power. Further, as they normally expect the lion's share
of their return from the corporation to be in the form of compensation
from the offices they hold rather than in the form of dividends from
their shareholdings, they naturally are more interested in keeping
their compensation (including bonuses and other "incentive" com-
pensation) high and in protecting it against future business vicissitudes
than they are in paying high dividends. Thus the tendency is for them
to retain profits in the business for use in its expansion (a larger enter-
prise justifying larger salaries for the officers) or for use as reserves
to see the corporation and its officers through lean years. In addition,
persons controlling a close corporation sometimes withhold dividends
to avoid heavy personal income taxes to which they themselves would
be subjected on corporate distributions. And, as has been mentioned,
majority shareholders in a close corporation sometimes deliberately
try to squeeze out a minority by withholding dividends, hoping ulti-
mately to buy out the minority interest at a price considerably less
than its actual value.
A minority shareholder's chances of obtaining relief against the
accumulation of earnings beyond the reasonable requirements of the
business26 are ordinarily not particularly bright2 7 He may have con-
26 The unreasonable accumulation of earnings may lead to tax grief.
27 See generally on minority shareholders' power to compel dividends in close
corporations, Scholder, Dividends and the Minority Stockholder in a Closely Held
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
siderable trouble establishing the facts-the amount of the corpora-
tion's earnings, what capital is needed for operation and expansion,
why the directors are withholding the profits and refusing to declare
dividends, and so on; and, even if he succeeds in establishing the facts,
he will still have difficulty in demonstrating that the facts evidence
a breach of duty by the directors. The courts in general permit man-
agement-whether in a close or publicly held corporation-to exercise
a high degree of discretion in two important respects.2" First, manage-
ment may exercise -discretion in the choice and application of the
accounting methods used to determine the existence and size of the
surplus or other fund available for dividends. 29 Second, the directors
are given broad discretion in deciding whether funds which the cor-
poration's books show are legally available for dividends shall be
distributed to the shareholders as dividends or shall be retained in the
business.
The doctrine is well settled ° that whether or not dividends are to
be declared and, if so, the amount of the dividends and when and how
they shall be paid, are matters to be decided by the directors. Never-
theless, there are limits to the directors' privilege to retain earnings in
the business; 3' and the courts, particularly in cases involving close
corporations,3 2 will exercise their equity powers against arbitrary
refusal of directors to declare and pay reasonable dividends. If the
directors act fraudulently or in bad faith in withholding dividends,
Corporation, 14 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 140 (1959); Note, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 123
(1956). See also Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 299 (1950). Success in a suit to compel the
directors to pay dividends may be only a temporary victory for a minority share-
holder, because the directors may refuse to pay future dividends without additional
litigation. But see, Patton v. Nickolas, 154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W.2d 848 (1955) (decree
to declare dividend at earliest practical date and thereafter to declare reasonable divi-
dends annually from future profits and accumulated surplus).
28 See Frey, The Distribution of Corporate Dividends, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 735, 736
(1941).
29 Ibid.
30 Lesnick v. Public Industrials Corp., 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944); Anderson v.
Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N.E. 647, 72 A.L.R. 959 (1930); Barrows v. J. N. Fauver
Co., 280 Mich. 553, 274 N.W. 325 (1937); Lockley v. Robie, 301 N.Y. 371, 93 N.E.2d
895 (1950) (close corporation); City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co.,
257 N.Y. 62, 177 N.E. 309, 76 A.L.R. 881 (1931) (a family corporation; president had
animosity toward one of the stockholders but a business reason for refusing to pay
dividends was shown); Kehl, Corporate Dividends 158 (1941).
3' See Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 246 N.Y. Supp. 204
(3d Dep't 1930).
32 For an early decision requiring the directors of a close corporation to declare
dividends, see Crichton v. Webb Press Co., 113 La. 167, 36 So. 926 (1904). For a more
recent decision requiring directors of a close corporation to declare dividends as re-
quired by a statute providing that directors shall declare dividends of accumulated
profits in excess of amount reserved as working capital, see Nebel v. Nebel, 241 N.C.
491, 85 S.E.2d 876 (1955).
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it is clear that the courts will grant equitable relief.' Where fraud or
bad faith is absent but the directors have unreasonably or arbitrarily
refused to declare dividends, the decisions are in conflict on whether
the courts will interfere and compel the payment of dividends.34 It
is believed, however, that most courts will require reasonably sound
business judgment from the directors and some consideration for
minority shareholders.35 As was said by the Supreme. Court of
Indiana,36 "the courts will not allow the directors to use their power
oppressively by refusing to declare dividends where the net profits and
the condition and character of the business clearly warrant it." The
ultimate test, according to the Supreme Court of Minnesota,3 7 "re-
solves itself into an examination of the good faith and reasonableness
of the policy of retaining that which otherwise is available for
dividends."
A proceeding to force the directors to declare a dividend is
equitable in nature.38 There is a split of authority on whether such a
proceeding should be brought in the name of the corporation as a
33 In re Brantman, 244 Fed. 101, 103 (2d Cir. 1917); W. Q. O'Neall Co. v.
O'Neali, 108 Ind. App. 116, 25 N.E.2d 656 (1940); Keough v. St. Paul Milk Co., 205
Minn. 96, 285 N.W. 809 (1939); Hlscock v. Lacey, 9 Misc. Rep. 578, 30 N.Y. Supp.
860 (Sup. Ct. 1894). "Undoubtedly the malicious suppression of dividends is a wrong
akin to breach of trust, for which the courts will afford a remedy." Patton v. Nickolas,
154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W.2d 848, 854 (1955). See also Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp.,
144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944) (question for jury whether directors' failure to declare
dividends was pursuant to a conspiracy to acquire a shareholder's stock).
34 Indicating that under such circumstances a court will not compel dividends:
Blanchard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 80 N.J. Eq. 209, 83 AtU. 220 (Ct. Err. & App. 1912)
(in the absence of fraud there is no ground for equitable interference); Gottfried v
Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692, 695 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ("There must also be bad faith on
the part of the directors.") See also Wabash Ry. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co.,
7 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1925) (equity can interfere only if there is bad faith or clear
abuse of discretion) ; Ballantine, Corporations § 232 (1946).
Indicating that under such circumstances a court will compel dividends: Gaines
v. Longs Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 331, 67 S.E.2d 355 (19 1); Stevens v. United States Steel
Corp., 68 N.J. Eq. 373, 378, 59 At. 905, 907 (Ch. 1905) (dictum); Tefit v. Schaefer,
136 Wash. 302, 239 Pac. 837, 840 (1925) (dictum).
35 See Whittemore v. Continental Mills, 98 F. Supp. 387 (D. Me. 1951) (com-
plaint alleging that board was improperly influenced by holder of majority stock who
gained taxwise by withholding of dividends stated a cause for relief in equity).
30 Star Pub. Co. v. Ball, 192 Ind. 158, 171, 134 N.E. 285, 290 (1922). "As a general
rule the officials of a corporation are the sole judges as to the propriety of declaring
dividends and the courts will not interfere with the proper exercise of that discretion.
Yet when the right to a dividend is clear and there are funds from which it can prop-
erly be made, a court of equity will interfere to compel a company to declare it. Di-
rectors are not allowed to use their power illegally, wantonly, or oppressively." W. Q.
O'Neall Co. v. O'Neall, 108 Ind. App. 116, 25 N.E.2d 656, 659 (1940) (preferred share-
holders allowed to maintain suit to compel dividends). See also Belfast & Moosehead
Lake R. Co. v. City of Belfast, 77 Me. 445, 454, 1 Atl. 362, 366 (1885).
37 Keough v. St. Paul Milk Co., 205 Minn. 96, 285 N.W. 809, 821 (1939).
38 Lawton v. Bedell, 71 Atl. 490 (N.J. Ch. 1908).
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derivative action39 or whether it should be brought as a class or repre-
sentative suit on behalf of all shareholders or of all shareholders in
a class.4" An attempt to get the corporation to act, unless such an
attempt would have been useless, is a condition precedent to the right
to bring the suit.41
(E) Power of Minority Shareholders To Prevent Dilution of
Their Interests through the Issuance of New Stock. Some courts have
been surprisingly reluctant to interfere to prevent the issuance of
stock that dilutes the interests of minority shareholders, 42 indicating
that if pre-emptive rights have been honored they will not intercede
to prevent the issuance of stock or to cancel an issue unless issuance of
the stock is in opposition to the interests of the corporation itself. To
make their decisions more palatable to minority shareholders who
claim they are not financially able to exercise their pre-emptive rights,
these courts have sometimes suggested that impecunious minority
shareholders could sell their pre-emptive rights43 or borrow to exercise
them, using the stock as security.44
These suggestions overlook the possible unfairness of permitting
majority shareholders to compel the minority shareholders to increase
their investment in the enterprise (when the welfare of the business
itself does not so require). After all, if minority shareholders are not
getting what they consider to be a fair return on their original invest-
ment and majority shareholders are trying to squeeze them out, the
minority shareholders naturally are hesitant "to throw good money
after bad" by making additional investments in the company; and
indeed there seems to be no compelling policy reason to require
39 Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 303 Mass. 1, 20 N.E.2d 482 (1939)
(a shareholder may bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation to have a
dividend declared). See also Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (Perm. ed.) § 5326; 27 St. John's L.
Rev. 360 (1953).
40 Stevens v. United States Steel Corp., 68 N.J.Eq. 373, 59 Atl. 905 (1905);
Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 69 N.J.Eq. 299, 60 Atl. 941 (Ch. 1905); Bal-
lantine, Corporations § 234 (Rev. ed. 1946).
41 Ballantine, Corporations § 234 (Rev. ed. 1946). "So far as we can discover
all the decisions recognizing the right to compel the declaration of dividends agree
that a shareholder cannot sue without first attempting to move the corporation, unless
such attempt would be useless, and that the corporation is at least a proper party to
a suit brought by a shareholder." Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 303 Mass.
1, 12, 20 N.E.2d 482, 490 (1939).
"The corporation is an indispensable party to an action to compel the issuance of
dividends on corporate stock, since it is the corporation's money which is to be paid
out on the order of the court." Whittemore v. Continental Mills, 98 F. Supp. 387, 391
(D. Me. 1951).
42 Bellows v. Porter, 201 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1953); Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342
Ill. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951); Schramme v. Cowin, 205 App. Div. 20, 199 N.Y.
Supp. 98 (1st Dep't 1923).
43 See Schramme v. Cowin, 205 App. Div. 20, 199 N.Y. Supp. 98, 100 (Ist Dep't
1923).
44 See Bellows v. Porter, 201 F.2d 429, 433-34 (8th Cir. 1953).
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minority shareholders to take the very real risks of large additional
investments in order to protect their existing holdings. Further, the
suggestions are unrealistic in the setting of a close corporation in that
outside purchasers for a minority interest in a close corporation can
seldom be found45 [and lenders are not likely to advance funds on
the security of such an interest especially if a contest between majority
and minority shareholders is impending].46 Perhaps underlying sug-
gestions such as these are unexpressed conclusions by the courts that
in the particular cases before them the minority shareholders actually
had the funds to purchase the shares offered but claimed impecunity
to buttress their opposition to a business decision of the majority.
An Illinois decision 47 illustrates how majority shareholders can
cause new shares to be issued to dilute the interests of the minority
holders who are not financially able to exercise their pre-emptive
rights. In that case, the corporation had outstanding 200 shares
of stock with a par value of $100 per share. Plaintiff held 40 shares,
or one-fifth of the total number outstanding. After a quarrel among
the shareholders, the other two shareholders caused a plan of re-
capitalization to be adopted under which (1) the par value of the
corporation's stock was reduced from $100 to $10, (2) the number of
shares outstanding was increased from 200 to 2,000 and (3) the issu-
ance of 68,000 additional shares at the $10 par value was authorized.
In due course, subscription warrants to the new shares were
issued to existing shareholders in recognition of their pre-emptive
rights. The other two shareholders promptly exercised their pre-
emptive rights, but plaintiff did not, allegedly because he did not have
the money to do so. Instead, plaintiff brought suit to restrain the
directors from carrying out the plan of reorganization and to nullify
acts already performed under it, charging that the plan was not
46 In Steven v. Hale-Haas Corp., 249 Wis. 205, 23 N.W.2d 620, 631 (1946), the
court realistically took cognizance of the difficulty of disposing of rights to subscribe
to shares in a close corporation, commenting that "in a closely held corporation which
operates locally the same factor that makes it difficult to appraise the value of the
stock may make it equally difficult in the event that new stock is issued for substan-
tially less than its true value to get any substantial protection from the exercise of
the pre-emptive right. This, for the reason that there will be no greater sale for sub-
scription rights than there is for the stock itself, and that those stockholders who had
sufficient control of the corporation to achieve reorganization are apt not to be in the
market for further shares. The circumstances may therefore point to an oppressive
attempt on the part of the controlling majority to compel minority stockholders to
keep putting more money into the corporation in order to prevent dilution of their
equity." "We consider, therefore, that plaintiff is right in his assertion that in a closely
held corporation the fact that the issue is to be sold at materially less than its value
may evidence an oppressive scheme directed against minority stockholders and render
wholly invalid as an abuse of discretion irrespective of provisions for pre-emptive
rights the corporate action authorizing the issue."
46 See Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236, 240-41 (Del. Ch. 1953).
47 Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342 III. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951).
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adopted for the benefit of the corporation but as a scheme to decrease
plaintiff's interest in the corporation.
The court held that the majority shareholders and directors had
not abused their discretion; that the reorganization plan was not
fraudulently oppressive; that by issuing to the plaintiff the additional
stock arising from the stock split and issuing him subscription warrants
for the new stock authorized, defendants had given plaintiff an oppor-
tunity to protect his pro rata interests and were not to blame for his
failure to obtain the money necessary to avail himself of his pre-
emptive rights; and that, as long as the plan was legal and fair, the
defendants' state of mind with respect to the plaintiff and the effect
of the plan on plaintiff's interests were immaterial. In response to
plaintiff's contention that the par value of the new stock (the price
at which it was issued) was insignificant compared to the actual value
of the stock, the court stated that the directors were not required to
"recommend" the stock at a price equivalent to its true value.48
On the other hand, a number of recent decisions, 49 proceeding on
the theory that directors and controlling shareholders are subject to
fiduciary duties to minority shareholders, have indicated that minority
shareholders will be protected against squeeze outs engineered by the
majority through the issuance of additional shares. In a North
Carolina case, 0 the corporation had ten outstanding shares of stock
with a par value of $100 each. Plaintiff, the holder of two shares,
brought suit to enjoin the proposed issuance of additional stock,
alleging that the corporation had prospered from its inception, that
it was not in need of additional operating capital but in fact had idle
money, that the corporation could at any time pay from its cash all
of its indebtedness, that the purpose of the plan to issue the stock was
to reduce the value of plaintiff's stock, and that the plan would reduce
the value of plaintiff's stock from $60,000 to $800. The court held
that the complaint stated a cause of action for equitable relief.
Although the majority has a right to control the corporation, when it
does so it becomes subject to a fiduciary obligation to the minority; 91
and courts of equity at the instance of minority shareholders who
are unable to obtain redress within the corporation and who do not
have a remedy at law will entertain jurisdiction to prevent any act on
the part of the majority which is in breach of those fiduciary duties.
The Court of Chancery of Delaware had indicted a perhaps even
greater readiness to protect minority shareholders against issues of
48 97 N.E.2d at 125.
49 Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953); Gaines v.
Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 340, 67 S.E.2d 350 (1951); cf. Steven v. Hale-Haas Corp.,
249 Wis. 205, 23 N.W.2d 620 (1946). See also Note, 35 N.C.L. Rev. 271 (1957).
50 Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 340, 67 SXE.2d 350 (1951).
51 See Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919).
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new shares which dilute their holdings. In a strongly worded opinion,
52
that court has stated that it will grant relief to minority shareholders
(1) whenever new shares are offered for grossly inadequate consid-
eration even though the pre-emptive rights of the minority share-
holders are honored, or (2) whenever the primary purpose of an
issue is to squeeze out a minority interest, and this irrespective of the
fairness of the price at which the shares are offered. In that case, one
defense was that the minority shareholder who had brought the suit
had not been injured by the issuance of the stock because he had been
offered his pro rata share of it. In response to that contention, the
Chancellor commented" that the plaintiff shareholder had "the right
not to purchase as well as the right to purchase. But his right not to
purchase is seriously impaired if the stock is worth substantially
more than its issuing price. . . . A' corporation is not permitted to
sell its stock for a legally inadequate price, at least where there is
objection. Plaintiff has a right to insist upon compliance with the law
whether or not he cares to exercise his option. He cannot block a
sale for a fair price merely because he disagrees with the wisdom of
the plan but he can insist that the sale price be fixed in accordance
with legal requirements."
(F) Relief Available to Minority Shareholders against Excessive
Compensation of Shareholder-Employees. Persons holding voting con-
trol in a corporation not uncommonly elect themselves directors and
officers, compensate themselves handsomely as employees of the cor-
poration, but exclude minority shareholders from corporate positions
carrying compensation. "Instead of treating all of the stock alike, and
distributing the profits fairly and proportionately by way of dividends,
the majority first elect themselves directors, then as directors elect
themselves officers, and then distribute among themselves a substantial
part of the profits in the way of excessive salaries, additional com-
pensation and other devices.""4 In a situation of this kind, what
remedies does a minority shareholder have? He cannot compel the
majority shareholders to elect him a director or the directors to make
him an officer, at least not in the absence of a valid shareholders'
agreement so providing. He probably cannot bring about the dissolu-
tion of the corporation except perhaps in cases of extreme abuse. 5
But can he force the majority shareholders to reduce their compensa-
tion and return to the corporation part of the excessive payments that
have been made to them? Perhaps so; but the litigation (it would
52 Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953).
53 99 A.2d at 240-41.
54 This sentence is quoted from Carr v. Kimball, 153 App. Div. 825, 139 N.Y.
Supp. 253, 259 (1st Dep't 1912), aff'd mem., 215 N.Y. 634, 109 N.E. 1068 (1915).
55 See Patton v. Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W.2d 848 (1955).
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probably take the form of a shareholders' derivative action)" might
be expensive and burdensome and the outcome of that litigation
would be uncertain.
The courts have not laid down definite rules to determine the
propriety of the amount of compensation paid corporate officers and
executives; perhaps they cannot. In any event, the rules are stated
in vague, elastic terms; and consequently the results reached in the
decisions are not entirely consistent. It has been said that share-
holders will not be permitted to take advantage of their ownership of
a controlling interest in a corporation to vote themselves excessive
salaries or to cause excessive salaries to be voted to them by directors
under their control.5" A New York court comments58 that the proposi-
tion is well settled "that the directors are trustees of the corporation
and for all the stockholders, and may not deal with themselves for
their own benefit, to the detriment of the corporation and the minority,
who, by a representative action, may cause the sums improperly taken
to be returned to the treasury." It has been said too that directors
must act honestly and reasonably in setting the compensation of
officers and executives,59 that in fixing compensation they will not be
56 See, e.g., Ashley v. Keith Oil Corp., 73 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1947) (stock-
holder's derivative suit); Uccello v. Gold'n Foods, Inc., 325 Mass. 319, 90 N.E.2d 530
(1950) (minority stockholder's bill seeking damages for mismanagement and restoration
of sums paid as salaries); Carr v. Kimball, 153 App. Div. 825, 139 N.Y. Supp. 253
(1st Dep't 1912), aff'd mem., 215 N.Y. 634, 109 N.E. 1068 (1915) (representative action
by minority stockholders to compel an accounting by directors). "And there is ample
authority to sustain the right of a minority stockholder to maintain a representative
action to recover salaries voted by the directors to themselves." Jones v. Van Heusen
Charles Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 246 N.Y. Supp. 204, 209 (3d Dep't 1930). Cf. Maguire
v. Osborne, 384 Pa. 430, 121 A.2d 147 (1956) (suit by minority stockholder against
the corporation, the majority stockholder, and two directors who were also employees
to compel the directors to return to the corporation moneys received by them as addi-
tional compensation).
Unless a minority shareholder acts with promptness to contest what he considers
to be excessive compensation paid to corporate officers or executives, he may find that
he is estopped or barred by laches. Uccello v. Gold'n Foods, Inc., 325 Mass, 319, 90
N.E.2d 530 (1950) (minority stockholder barred by acquiescence as he knew of pay-
ments); Riddle v. Mary A. Riddle Co., 142 N.J.Eq. 147, 59 A.2d 599 (Ch. 1948)
(delay in bringing suit as well as actual affirmative approval of compensation payment
may bar stockholder); Maguire v. Osborne, 384 Pa. 430, 121 A.2d 147 (1956) (share-
holder estopped to raise an issue of quantum of compensation payable in 1950 and
thereafter under a 1948 agreement as no objection made to compensation paid under
the agreement before 1950, though company's profits and officers' compensation based
on profits were small for the earlier years). But see Worley v. Dunkle, 2 N.J. Super.
161, 62 A.2d 699 (Ch. 1948) (minority shareholder's suit not barred by shareholder's
failure promptly to protest).
57 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (Perm. ed.) § 2132.
58 Car v. Kimball, 153 App. Div. 825, 139 N.Y. Supp. 253, 259 (1st Dep't 1912),
aff'd mem., 215 N.Y. 634, 109 N.E. 1068 (1915).
59 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (Perm. ed.) § 2132. See also Barrett v. Smith, 185 Minn.
596, 242 N.W. 392, 394 (1932) (salaries of corporate officers may be so high as to
evidence fraud and oppression on minority).
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permitted to "waste" the corporation's assets,60 that compensation
must bear some reasonable relation not only to the value of the services
rendered6' but also to the ability of the corporation to pay, 2 and that
courts of equity will review the fairness and reasonableness of com-
pensation.6 s
Whether or not executive compensation is reasonable is a ques-
tion of fact.6 4 Among the factors which courts say they consider in
passing on the reasonableness of compensation are the following: the
executive's ability, the quantity and quality of the services he renders,
the time he devotes to the company, the difficulties involved and
responsibilities assumed in his work, the success he has achieved, the
profits resulting to the corporation from his efforts to build up its
business, the amounts under his jurisdiction, the corporation's financial
condition, and increases in the volume or quality of the corporation's
business."
In spite of their professed determination to grant relief to
minority shareholders against excessive salaries of corporate officers
or executives, the courts actually seldom interfere with decisions by
corporate directors fixing officers' or executives' compensation. 6 This
reluctance is grounded on a general disinclination to substitute their
judgment for that of the directors on matters of internal management,
matters which the shareholders have entrusted to the directors, 7 and
60 Baker v. Cohn, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. 1942), modified and aff'd, 266 App.
Div. 715, 40 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Ist Dep't 1943), aff'd as modified, 292 N.Y. 57a, 54 N.E.2d
689 (1944).
61 See Nemser v. Aviation Corp., 47 F. Supp. 515 (D. Del. 1942); Schall v. Althaus,
208 App. Div. 103, 105, 203 N.Y. Supp. 36, 38 (1st Dep't 1924). See also Swan, Cir. J.,
dissenting, in Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1932).
02 Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 531, 537 (D. Minn. 1924); Baker v. Cohn, 42
N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. 1942), modified and aff'd, 266 App. Div. 715, 40 N.Y.S.2d 623
(1st Dep't 1943), aff'd as modified, 292 N.Y. 570, 54 N.E.2d 689 (1944).
,03 Stratis v. Anderson, 254 Mass. 536, 150 N.E. 832, 44 AJ.R. 567 (1926); Worley
v. Dunkle, 2 N.J. Super. 161, 62 A.2d 699 (Ch. 1948) (fixing of salary by the sole vote
of a majority shareholder is subject to review by the court of equity); Ballantine,
Corporations § 76 (Rev. ed. 1946).
64 Black v. Parker Mfg. Co., 329 Mass. 105, 106 N.E.2d 544 (1952).
65 Id. at 115, 106 N.E.2d at 551; Gallin v. National City Bank of N. Y., 152 Misc.
679, 273 N.Y. Supp. 87, 113 (Sup. Ct. 1934). That additional compensation would have
gone to pay income tax if it had not been voted to corporate officer does not justify
voting it. Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1947). Cf. Black
v. Parker Mfg. Co., supra note 64 (effect of taxes on income of corporate officer and
on income of the corporation properly to be considered in determining reasonableness of
officer's salary).
60 Bachellor v. Olmstead, 261 Fed. 533, 536 (W.D.N.Y. 1919); Cron v. Tanner, 171
Kan. 57, 229 P.2d 1008 (1951); Riddle v. Mary A. Riddle Co., 142 N.J. Eq. 147, 59
A.2d 599 (Ch. 1948); Garbarino v. Utica Uniform Co., 269 App. Div. 622, 58 N.Y.S.2d
136 (4th Dep't 1945), aff'd 295 N.Y. 794, 66 N.E.2d 579 (1946); Fletcher Cyc. Corp.
(Perm. ed.) § 2133.
67 "The court would not be authorized to substitute its judgment for theirs [the
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on the conclusion reached by some courts that issues of the excessive-
ness of compensation are difficult if not impossible to resolve satis-
factorily.68 Unless the majority shareholders and the directors are
clearly managing the affairs of the corporation dishonestly or the
compensation payments are so unreasonable that they can be charac-
terized as "waste" or "spoliation," the courts have been at a loss to
find a proper reason for substituting their judgment for that of the
directors.
Perhaps the courts' concern about usurping functions of the
board is misplaced in compensation cases arising out of close corpora-
tions, because close corporations seldom if ever have independent
and disinterested directors making the decisions on compensation; the
directors are almost always both shareholders and officers or are
closely controlled by majority shareholders. Nevertheless, the deci-
sions indicate that courts will seldom interfere in either publicly held"0
or close corporations70 with directors' decisions on the amounts of
officers' or executives' compensation.
(G) Power of Minority Shareholders To Bring About an Equity
Receivership or a Statutory Dissolution. The general rule has been
laid down in many decisions that aside from statute, courts of equity
do not have power to wind up a solvent corporation or to appoint a
receiver for the liquidation of its affairs."' Thus, a receiver will not be
directors'] as to what are proper salaries, provided they acted in good faith within their
powers, and the salaries fixed by them were not clearly excessive." Matthews v. Headley
Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 523, 100 At. 645, 650 (1917).
The Delaware courts have laid down the following rule: "In the absence of fraud,
either express or implied, the action of the governing body of a corporation, in matters
of internal management . .. will not be disturbed by a Court of Equity." Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 26 Del. Ch. 16, 29, 21 A.2d
178, 184 (Ch. 1941); Mercantile Trading Co. v. Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 17 Del. Ch.
325, 333-34, 154 Ati. 457, 461 (Ch. 1931); Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16
Del. Ch. 157, 169, 142 At. 654, 660 (Ch. 1928).
68 See Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343, 350 (D. Del. 1948).
69 See Washington and Rothschild, Compensating the Corporate Executive, 413
(Rev. ed. 1951); Note, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 232, 238 (1949).
70 For an analysis of the decisions relating to executive compensation in closely
held companies, see Washington and Rothschild, supra note 69, at 363-381. Where
relief has been granted, the compensation has usually been glaringly excessive. See, e.g.,
Baker v. Cohn, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. 1942), modified and aff'd, 266 App. Div. 715,
40 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1st Dep't 1943), aff'd as modified, 292 N.Y. 570, 54 N.E.2d 689 (1944),
where the salaries of the officers totaled 44 per cent of the corporation's gross income
and the ratio of salaries to net income ranged from 80 per cent to 102 per cent.
71 People ex rel. Daniels v. District Court of Denver, 33 Colo. 293, 80 Pac. 908
(1905); Lush'us Brand Distributors, Inc. v. Fort Dearborn Lithograph Co., 330 Ill. App.
216, 70 N.E.2d 737 (1946); Wallace v. Pierce-Wallace Pub. Co., 101 Iowa 313, 70 N.W.
216 (1897); Bowman v. Gum, Inc., 321 Pa. 516, 184 At. 258 (1936); Hammond v.
Hammond, 216 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Ballantine, Corporations § 304 (Rev,
ed. 1946) ; 13 Am. Jur., Corporations § 1295 (1938). "The general equity jurisdiction of
the courts does not extend to distributing the assets of a corporation merely because
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appointed to wind up a corporation merely because a shareholder is
dissatisfied with some of the decisions made by management or is
generally unhappy with the way the business of the corporation is
being conducted.72 Nor will such relief be granted to a shareholder
merely because the other shareholder in the corporation has breached
an agreement between the two.73  Further, the courts have often
refused to appoint a receiver or to decree a winding up on the basis
of quarreling or dissatisfaction among the shareholders,74 at least if
the corporation was actively engaged in business and capable of
carrying out its corporate functions.75 And courts have even denied
such relief where directors of a corporation were holding over after
the expiration of their terms because the shareholders were dead-
locked and were unable to elect new directors.76
Most of the modern courts, however, recognize a number of
exceptions to the general rule,7 exceptions which are particularly
need for its continued existence is not apparent." Bleck v. East Boston Co., 302 Mass.
127, 130, 18 N.E.2d 536, 537 (1939); Rizzuto v. Onset Cafe, Inc., 330 Mass. 595, 116
N.E.2d 249, 250 (1953).
72 Lyon v. Bollinger, 221 Ark. 423, 253 S.W.2d 773, 778 (1952) (dictum);
Indianapolis Dairymen's Co-op v. Bottema, 226 Ind. 237, 79 N.E.2d 399 (1948); Enter-
prise Printing & Publishing Co. v. Craig, 195 Ind. 302, 144 N.E. 542, rehearing denied,
195 Ind. 302, 145 N.E. 309 (1924); Troutman v. Council Bluffs Street Fair & Carnival
Co., 142 Iowa 140, 120 N.W. 730 (1909); Reid Drug Co. v. Salyer, 268 Ky. $22, 105
S.W.2d 625 (1937). 'Where the corporation is a going concern it is undoubtedly true
that a minority stockholder cannot maintain a bill to have it dissolved or to have its
assets distributed. In such case, if the shareholders disapprove of the company's
management or consider their speculation a bad one, their remedy is to'elect new officers
or to sell their shares and withdraw." Corning Custom Gin Co. v. Oliver, 171 Ark.
175, 283 S.W. 977, 978 (1926).
73 McKay v. Beard, 20 S.C. 156 (1883).
74 Freedman v. Fox, 67 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1953); Sternberg v. Wolff, 56 N.J.Eq.
555, 42 Ad. 1078 (Ch. 1898) (dissensions not sufficient to justify appointment of a
receiver, at least in absence of a showing of injury to business or mismanagement);
Bowman v. Gum, Inc., 321 Pa. 516, 184 At. 258 (1936). "Mere dissensions among cor-
porate stockholders, whether over internal matters or otherwise, will seldom justify the
appointment of a receiver." Drob v. National Memorial Park, Inc., 28 Del. Ch. 254,
41 A.2d 589, 597 (Ch. 1945). See also Comment, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 714, 720 (1943),
expressing the view that dissension is not an independent ground for dissolution but
rather a factor that contributes to a factual situation requiring relief on other grounds.
75 Freedman v. Fox, 67 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1953) (conflict was serious but corpora-
tion was still functioning); Hanes v. Watkins, 63 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1953); McGuire v.
Kaysen-McGuire, 184 Minn. 553, 239 N.W. 616 (1931).
76 Alabama Coal & Coke Co. v. Shackelford, 137 Ala. 224, 34 So. 833 (1903);
Lush'us Brand Distributors, Inc. v. Fort Dearborn Lithograph Co., 330 Inl. App. 216,
70 N.E.2d 737 (1946); McGuire v. Kaysen-McGuire Co., 184 Minn. 553, 239 N.W. 616
(1931) (the corporation was a holding company, however, and there was no claim of
mismanagement). Some cases indicate that a different result might be reached if
"there is a present danger to the interests of the stockholders, consisting of a serious
suspension of or interference with the conduct of the business, and a threatened de-
predation of the value of the assets consequent thereon, which may be met and remedied
by a receiver." Reid Drug Co. v. Salyer, 268 Ky. 522, 105 S.W.2d 625, 629 (1937);
Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (Perm. Ed.) § 7713.
77 See Stevens, Corporations § 199 (2d ed. 1949); 56 Mich. L. Rev. 1019 (1958).
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applicable to situations brought about by dissension or deadlock
among the shareholders of a close corporation. Among the situations
in which courts will now often afford relief by appointing a receiver
and winding up a corporation are the following: (1) the directors or
officers have been guilty of fraud, have abused and oppressed share-
holders, or have grossly mismanaged the corporation;78 (2) a dead-
lock exists among the shareholders which has resulted in stoppage of
corporate activities or culminated in a usurpation of control by part of
the shareholders to the exclusion of the others; 79 (3) because of dis-
sension or otherwise, it has become impossible for the corporation to
attain the objectives for which it was formed8" or for the business to be
carried on profitably.8' Dissension among shareholders, directors or
officers rendering it impossible for a corporation to operate at all or
to operate in a way that is advantageous to the shareholders often has
been recognized as a proper ground for winding up, at least if im-
minent danger of loss of assets is threatened and no other relief is
available.8"
Especially in cases involving close corporations, courts have
manifested a willingness to wind up and even to dissolve a corpora-
tion wracked by bitter dissension among its shareholders; sometimes
78 Ashton v. Penfield, 233 Mo. 391, 135 S.W. 938 (1911) (majority shareholders
knowingly kept fraudulent general manager in charge of the corporation's affairs);
Lennan v. Blakeley, 273 App. Div. 767, 75 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Ist Dep't 1947); Patton v.
Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W.2d 848 (1955) (in more extreme cases of abuse of
minority shareholders, court may decree liquidation and appoint a receiver for that
purpose or it may appoint a receiver for the less drastic purpose of rehabilitation).
See Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind Up a Corpora-
tion at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 220 (1940).
79 Saltz v. Saltz Bros., Inc., 84 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1936); Campbell v. Pennsylvania
Industries, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 199 (D. Del. 1951) (equity may liquidate solvent corpora-
tion in the event of deadlock between factions seeking to control it); Burleson v.
Hayutin, 130 Colo. 58, 273 P.2d 124 (1954); Sternberg v. Wolff, 56 N.J.Eq. 389, 39
At. 397 (Ct. Err. & App. 1898); Guaranty Laundry Co. v. Pulliam, 200 Okla. 185, 191
P.2d 975 (1948); Boothe v. Summit Coal Mining Co.. 55 Wash. 167, 104 Pac. 207
(1909). See Drob v. National Memorial Park, Inc., 28 Del. Ch. 254, 41 A.2d 589, 598
(Ch. 1945), suggesting that the proper remedy in the event of deadlock is not the
winding up of the corporation but the appointing of a temporary receiver to preserve
the corporate assets until it can function properly.
80 State v. Breedlove, 38 Tenn. App. 80, 270 S.W.2d 582 (1953) (suit in the name
of the state on relation of five preferred shareholders).
81 Flemming v. Heffner & Flemming, 263 Mich. 561, 248 N.W. 900 (1933); Miner v.
Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218, 17 L.R.A. 412 (1892). "The power of this
court to appoint a receiver of a corporation either because it has no properly constituted
governing body, or because there are such dissensions in its governing body as to make
it impossible for the corporation to carry on its business with advantage to its stock-
holders, I think must be regarded as settled .... " Edison v. Edison United Phonograph
Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 625, 29 At. 195, 197 (Ch. 1894).
82 Burleson v. Hayutin, 130 Colo. 58, 273 P.2d 124 (1954) ; Hammond v. Hammond,
216 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) ; Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1260, 1263-64 (1950),
and authorities there cited.
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they have indicated that dissolution or winding up will be granted in
a close corporation whenever similar relief would be granted in a
partnership. 3 As was said by a Michigan court, 4 there "are many
authorities which uphold the power of a court of chancery to dissolve
a corporation because of dissensions of so serious a character as under
the circumstances will inevitably defeat the purpose for which it was
created. Especially is such the holding in cases where there are only
a few stockholders so that the corporation for practical purposes as
between those interested is much like a partnership."
Modern courts recognize so many exceptions to the general rule
that courts do not have power in the absence of statute to dissolve or
wind up a corporation and the exceptions are applied so frequently
that the exceptions seem to have eaten up the rule. No longer is the
question whether the courts have jurisdiction or power to appoint a
receiver to wind up a corporation or even to dissolve it in the sense of
terminating its legal existence.85 The real question is whether a court
will exercise its power in the particular case before it. Perhaps the
attitude of most modern courts would be accurately stated by a, rule
worded somewhat as follows: courts are hesitant to decree the winding
up or dissolution of a corporation, but they will do so whenever they
conclude that such action is reasonably necessary to protect ade-
quately the interests of the shareholders or some of them.
Nevertheless, in some situations, e.g., where the shareholders are
deadlocked but the corporation is still operating successfully, it is
difficult to prophesy what a court will do. The type of line-drawing
which is sometimes engaged in is illustrated by two Colorado cases.
In one,8" where a deadlock had caused the corporation to "bog down"
83 "But we find no real disagreement in the adjudications in cases where like relief
upon similar grounds is sought in actions against mismanaged copartnerships.... If the
rule be sound as applied to copartnerships, the manner and form of the organization of
corporation would seem not a sufficient reason for denying similar relief at the suit of
stockholders thereof." Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65,
162 N.W. 1056, 1058, L.R.A. 1917E 784 (1917). See also In re Yenidje Tobacco Co.,
[1916] 2 Ch. 426 (Ct. App.). But for cases refusing to treat "incorporated partnerships"
as partnerships for dissolution purposes, see Hanes v. Watkins, 63 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1953) ;
Hennessy v. During, 124 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1953). "There is no occasion, either, for
holding that, after all, the corporation is only a partnership. . . . The corporation was
chartered by the State, contracted and incurred debts as a corporation and in all
respects operated in that capacity. Apparently it is only when dissension arises that the
respondents became dissatisfied with their position as stockholders." Freedman v. Fox,
67 So. 2d 692, 693 (Fla. 1953).
84 Flemming v. Heffner & Flemming, 263 Mich. 561, 568, 248 N.W. 900, 902 (1933).
85 For a discussion of the trend toward recognition of a general equity power to
dissolve a corporation, see Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of
Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 778, 787-88 (1952). Some courts recog-
nize the general equity power even though there is a statutory provision for dissolution,
holding that the statutory remedy is not exclusive. Id. at 788.
80 Burleson v. Hayutin, 130 Colo. 58, 273 P.2d 124 (1954).
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and one faction of shareholders had excluded the other from the
profits of the business, the Supreme Court of Colorado decreed that a
receiver should be appointed. In the other,87 decided less than a year
later, where there was a deadlock but no fraud or mismanagement
was alleged, that court refused to permit the dissolution of the
corporation.
Practically all jurisdictions now have statutes setting forth pro-
cedures for dissolving a corporation and stating the grounds on which
a corporation will be dissolved. In general, the effect of the statutes
has been to increase the number of situations in which the courts will
decree a winding up or dissolution.8 Dissolution statutes vary con-
siderably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,89 but on the whole fall into
two broad classes: statutes fixing procedures for the voluntary dissolu-
tion of a corporation and statutes stating the circumstances in which
courts may entertain proceedings for the involuntary winding up or
dissolution of a corporation.
The voluntary dissolution statutes ordinarily authorize a corpora-
tion to dissolve whenever dissolution is approved by specified percent-
age of its shareholders. Often voluntary dissolution proceedings may
be conducted either out of court or subject to the supervision of a
courtf 0
Voluntary dissolution of course offers a way for a dissatisfied
shareholder to escape from an unhappy business connection if he can
muster the shareholder vote (and in some jurisdictions the director
vote) required by the statute. Many of the statutes, however, set a
87 Hepner v. Miller, 130 Colo. 243, 274 P.2d 818 (1954). See also Note, 32 Dicta
314 (1955).
88 There is a conflict on whether the enactment of statutes on dissolution deprives
a court of its general equity powers to wind up a corporation. For authorities suggesting
that the courts retain their equity powers to dissolve, see Dorf v. Hill Bus Co., 140
N.J. Eq. 444, 54 A.2d 761, 763 (1947) ; Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence:
Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 778, 788 (1952). The Court of
Appeals of New York, however, has stated that "the method of effecting corporate
dissolution, when prescribed by statute, as in this state, is exclusive, and must be sub-
stantially followed." In re Importers' & Grocers' Exchange, 132 N.Y, 212, 217, 30 N.E.
401, 403 (1892). See also Cachules v. Finkelstein, 279 App. Div. 173, 109 N.Y.S.2d 272,
274-75 (lst Dep't 1951).
In New York there is no statutory procedure for winding up or dissolving a corpo-
ration at the suit of a minority shareholder. The New York courts, however, have
required the directors of a corporation to dissolve it if they are continuing the corpora-
tion's existence for the sole purpose of benefiting those in control of the corporation at
the expense of the other shareholders. Lennan v. Blakeley, 273 App. Div. 767, 75
N.Y.S.2d 331 (1st Dep't 1947); Kroger v. Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641, 248 N.Y. Supp.
387 (1st Dep't 1931); cf. Fontheim v. Walker, 282 App. Div. 373, 122 N.Y.S.2d 642
(1st Dep't 1953), aff'd mem, 306 N.Y. 926, 119 N.E.2d 605 (1954). N.Y. Stock Corp.
Law § 9 contains a statement that nothing in that section is to be construed to limit
the power of a court of equity to decree a dissolution in a proper case.
89 See generally Ballantine, Corporations §§ 301-06 (Rev. ed. 1946).
90 See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 23.44.010 (1951).
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two-thirds or three-fourths vote of the shareholders, and thus they
give no relief at all to a minority shareholder; and even a majority
shareholder may be stymied because he does not control enough votes
to get the statutory majority.
Statutes providing for the involuntary dissolution of a corpora-
tion in a suit by a minority shareholder 9' are more likely than the
voluntary dissolution statutes to be useful in resolving problems arising
out of dissension and deadlock. The involuntary dissolution statutes
typically authorize the courts in a suit by a shareholder or by the
holder of a specified percentage of a corporation's shares to wind up or
dissolve a corporation if its directors or majority shareholders are
guilty of fraudulent conduct or if the winding up of the corporation
is necessary to protect the rights of the shareholders. 2
In some states, the statutes providing for involuntary dissolution
state some of the grounds for dissolution in very broad and general
terms. The Connecticut statute,93 for instance, provides that when-
ever "any good and sufficient reason" exists for the dissolution of a
corporation, any shareholder or shareholders owning not less than
one-tenth of its stock may apply for its dissolution and for the appoint-
ment of a receiver to wind up its affairs. In spite of the breadth of the
language in which such statutory grounds for dissolution are stated,
courts have sometimes refused to recognize that corporations wracked
by dissension or paralyzed by deadlock qualify for winding up or
dissolution on those statutory grounds.9 4
In a few states,95 the statutes, although permitting a minority
shareholder to seek relief through the winding up or dissolution of the
corporation, empower majority shareholders to avoid the dissolution
by purchasing the shares of the dissatisfied shareholder at their fair
value as determined by a prescribed procedure. This buy-out feature
is desirable because it permits majority shareholders to preserve the
enterprise as a going business and at the same time guarantees a
dissatisfied shareholder a fair price for his holdings.
Many jurisdictions, including practically all the more important
91 A number of states also have statutes providing for the involuntary dissolution
of a corporation in a proceeding brought by the Attorney General for the corporation's
failure to file reports or pay taxes or for its abuse of its powers. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat.
c. 32, § 157.82 (Smith-Hurd 1954). A statute of this type of course offers little or no
promise of relief to an aggrieved or dissatisfied shareholder in a close corporation. See
Note, 32 N.C.L. Rev. 335 n. 11 (1954), for the attitude of the Attorney General of
North Carolina on the use of such a statute.
92 See, e.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2852-1107 (1938).
93 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5226 (1949).
94 See, e.g., Bator v. United Sausage Co., 138 Conn. 18, 81 A.2d 442 (1951).
95 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5228 (1949); Calif. Corp. Code Ann. 99 4658-59 (Deering
1953) ; W. Va. Code Ann. § 3093 (1955). See also Hall v. McLuckey, 135 W. Va. 864, 65
S.E.2d 494 (1951).
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commercial and industrial states, now have statutes specifically au-
thorizing corporate dissolution in situations of deadlock in director
or shareholder voting 0 There is considerable variation from juris-
diction to jurisdiction in the language of these statutes and some differ-
ences in the kinds of deadlock situations covered.
The New York statute 7 authorizes dissolution in the following
situations: (1) a corporation has an even number of directors who
are equally divided respecting the management of its affairs; (2) the
votes of a corporation's stockholders are so divided that they cannot
elect a board of directors;"' or (3) a corporation's certificate of incor-
poration requires a vote for director action or a stockholder vote for
election of directors greater than otherwise would be required by
law,9 and the directors are divided respecting the management of
the corporation's affairs in such a way that the requisite number of
votes for action cannot be obtained or the votes of the stockholders
are so divided that the requisite number of votes for election of
directors cannot be obtained.100 An important restriction on a court's
right to dissolve under the New York statute is that it must appear
that the dissolution will be beneficial to the stockholders and not
injurious to the public.' This requirement has been applied by the
96 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code Ann. §§ 4650-51 (Deering 1953); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 32,
§§ 157.86-91 (Smith-Hurd 1954); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 25-242 (1948); Mass. Ann. Laws
c. 155, § 50 (1948); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:13-15 (Supp. 1956); N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law
§§103-117; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.91 (Baldwin Supp. 1956); Pa. Stat. Ann. it.
15, §§ 2852-1107-10 (1938).
97 N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 103. See generally on deadlock-dissolution problems in
New York, Burstein, The Dissolution of Closed Corporations, 123 N.Y.L.J. 1464, 1484,
1504 (April 26-28, 1950); Note, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 300 (1952); 50 Colum. L. Rev. 100
(1950).
98 Under this provision, the fact that the stockholders are evenly divided on how
the business should be conducted is not sufficient; there must be a showing of an
unsuccessful attempt to elect directors. Application of Landau, 183 Misc. 876, 51
N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
99 Unanimity and high vote requirements of this sort are authorized in New York
by N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 9.
1oo For the use of this ground as a basis for dissolution, see Application for Dis-
solution of Fulton-Washington Corp., 3 Misc.2d 277, 151 N.Y.S.2d 417 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 981, 157 N.Y.S.2d 894 (2d Dep't 1956).
The New York statute clearly provides that the stockholders by a provision in the
certificate of incorporation can stipulate against dissolution on the grounds numbered
(1) and (2) in the text. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 103. However, Application of Cohen,
183 Misc. 1034, 52 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 663, 53
N.Y.S.2d 467 (Ist Dep't 1945), held that a stockholders' agreement to submit disputes
to arbitration does not deprive dissatisfied stockholders of the right to petition for
dissolution without resort to arbitration.
Query whether a provision in the certificate of incorporation stipulating against
dissolution on ground (3) would be given effect. See N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 103.
101 N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 117; In re Seamerlin Operating Co., 307 N.Y. 407, 121
N.E.2d 392 (1954); In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 NX.2d 563 (1954);
Application of Cantelmo, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1st Dep't 1949) (dissolu-
tion will not be granted as beneficial to the stockholders where petitioner is seeking to
24
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Court of Appeals to deny dissolution of a deadlocked corporation if it
is profitable. 02
The deadlock statutes clearly cover a deadlock in which a board
with an even number of members divides equally and the shareholders
cannot resolve the deadlock by election of a new board because the
shares are evenly divided between two shareholders or two factions.
Some of the statutes, however, apparently do not authorize the dis-
solution of a corporation which is deadlocked, not because of an equal
division among directors and shareholders, but because the charter
or by-laws of the corporation require unanimity or a high vote for
director or shareholder action and no faction can get the necessary
vote; 103 or if they do authorize dissolution in such a situation they do
not permit a shareholder with relatively small holdings to bring the
petition. 4 Thus, the Massachusetts statute0 5 does not permit a
petition for involuntary dissolution to be filed on the basis of deadlock
except by the holder or holders of not less than forty per cent of the
corporation's stock, and then only if the votes of the corporation's
board of directors and of its stockholders "are equally divided on a
question affecting the general management of the affairs of the cor-
poration, or if the votes of its stockholders are equally divided in the
election of directors, and there appears to be no way of reaching an
agreement and breaking such deadlock."'10
BIUTIsH REMEDIES
(A) Remedies in General. The rights of a shareholder in an
English company to bring a derivative action are considerably nar-
oust other stockholder from the business) ; In re Norton & Schneider, Inc., 137 N.Y.S.2d
269 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (court recognized that its refusal to dissolve meant that the corpora-
tion would have to function for an indefinite time with a holdover hoard because the
shares were evenly divided and could not elect a new board, but it denied dissolution
because there had been no showing that dissolution would benefit the shareholders).
102 In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954) (profitable
operation of a deadlocked corporation warrants dismissal of dissolution petition without
a hearing), noted 68 Harv. L. Rev. 714 (1955), 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1485 (1954). In
Application for Dissolution of Fulton-Washington Corp., 3 Misc.2d 277, 151 N.Y.S.2d
417 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 981, 157 N.Y.S.2d 894 (2d Dep't 1956), the
court entertained a petition for involuntary dissolution even though the corporation
was continuing to operate at a profit, saying that the rule against the dissolution of
profitable corporations was not applicable, as the corporation involved had been
organized to buy and resell specific real estate and the participants had from the first
intended to liquidate the corporation after the resale of the realty.
103 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.28 (1956); La. Rev. Stat. § 12:55(4) (1950);
Wash. Rev. Code § 23:44:030(4) (1951). See also Powers, Cross Fire on the Close
Corporation: Norms Versus Needs, 9 U. Fla. L. Rev. 433, 462 (1958).
104 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 4650 (Deering 1953) (petitioners must be
holders of not less than one-third of shares for not less than six months).
105 Mass. Ann. Laws c. 155, § 50 (1948).
106 Emphasis added.
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rower than those of a shareholder in an American corporation. The
famous English decision of Foss v. Harbottle,10 7 it is true, was a fore-
runner of the derivative action as it is known in this country in that
the court in that decision recognized that a shareholder in some cir-
cumstances can assert the corporation's right to recover for wrongs
to the corporation. However, that decision and subsequent ones 08
limited the shareholder's suit to one in which fraudulent or ultra vires
acts have been committed against the corporation and the persons
against whom relief is sought control the company and are preventing
an action from being brought in the company's name. One effect of
this limitation is to shield directors from shareholder suits based on
their negligence.
However circumscribed the rights of a shareholder in an English
company (as compared with the rights of his counterpart in an
American corporation) to bring a derivative action, he is perhaps
more than compensated by the greater statutory and administrative
protection he enjoys. For example, the Board of Trade, a govern-
mental agency charged with the general supervision of English com-
panies, is empowered to appoint an inspector to look into the affairs of
a company if there are circumstances suggesting that "persons con-
cerned with its formation or the management of its affairs have in
connection therewith been guilty of fraud, misfeasance or other
misconduct towards it or towards its members" or that "its members
have not been given all the information with respect to its affairs
which they might reasonably expect."' 0 9 After a report from its
inspector, the Board of Trade may publish a report of the inspector's
findings (a copy of the report then becomes admissible in any legal
proceedings), may cause criminal proceedings to be brought, or may
petition a court for a winding-up order or for an order under Section
210 of the Companies Act (this statutory section will be discussed in
detail presently).
The Companies Act also empowers the court on a shareholder's
petition to wind up a company, among other circumstances, if the
court "is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the company
should be wound up.""10 That provision has been on the statute books
in substantially its present form for over a hundred years. It has
occasionally been used successfully to solve problems of dissension' or
deadlock in private companies. Thus, where the managing director
was guilty of grave irregularities in making a secret profit, the court
107 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch. 1843).
108 E.g., Pavlides v. Jensen, [19561 Ch. 565, noted 19 Modem L. Rev. 538 (1956),
74 SA.L.J. 86 (1957).
109 English Companies Act, 1948, § 165. See also id. § 164.
110 English Companies Act, 1948, § 222.
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decreed a winding-up."' And, the courts have ordered a winding-up
in a number of cases11 in which such a complete deadlock of manage-
ment had occurred that the company's activities would have been
brought to a standstill if the court had not intervened.
Nevertheless, English judges, just as their American brothers,
have been reluctant to decree a winding-up whenever that action was
opposed by majority shareholders; and the books contain singularly
few cases in which an oppressed minority in an English company
secured a winding-up order. As a general proposition, the English
courts heretofore have imposed a winding-up only if some plain in-
justice was being done petitioner which could not be remedied other-
wise than by a winding-up order.113
The Companies Act of 1948 contains a cautiously worded provi-
sion designed to somewhat broaden the courts' use of winding-up on
"just and equitable" grounds and to make clear the power of a court
to order a winding-up notwithstanding the existence of an alternative
remedy. That provision reads as follows:
Where the petition is presented by members of the
company as contributories on the ground that it is just and
equitable that the company should be wound up, the court,
if it is of opinion-
(a) that the petitioners are entitled to relief either by
winding up the company or by some other means;
and
(b) that in the absence of any other remedy it would be
just and equitable that the company should be
wound up;
shall make a winding up order, unless it is also of the opinion
both that some other remedy is available to the petitioners
and that they are acting unreasonably in seeking to have
the company wound up instead of pursuing that other
remedy." 4
(B) Section 210 Remedy. Perhaps the most interesting innova-
111 Re Newbridge Sanitary Steam Laundry, Ltd., [1917] 1 Ir. R. 67.
112 E.g., Re American Pioneer Leather Co., [1918] 1 Ch. 556; Re Yenidje Tobacco
Co., Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch. 426.
113 See Peppiatt, Statutory Protection of Minority Shareholders in English Limited
Companies, 14 Bus. Law. 621, 629 (1959).
114 English Companies Act, 1948, § 225(2). For other statutory sections furnishing
some protection to minority shareholders in rather narrow situations, see English
Companies Act, 1948, § 72 (right of holders of 15 per cent or more of a class of shares
to apply to court to have action modifying rights of shares canceled), §§ 206-208 (court
approval required for "arrangements"), § 209(2) (right of minority shareholders in a
company ninety per cent of whose shares are acquired by another company to -compel
the acquiring company to buy their shares).
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tion of the Companies Act of 1948 was Section 210, the objective of
which is to enlarge the protection afforded to minorities by providing
an alternative remedy to winding up in cases of oppression. The Com-
mittee on Company Law Amendment which recommended the enact-
ment of Section 210 pointed out that in many instances the winding-up
of a company does not benefit the minority shareholders, because the
break-up value of the assets may be small or the only available pur-
chaser may be that very majority whose oppression drove the minority
to seek redress." 5 Therefore, the Committee suggested that "the
Court should have, in addition, the power to impose upon the parties
to a dispute whatever settlement the Court considers just and equi-
table. This discretion must be unfettered, for it is impossible to lay
down a general guide to the solution of what are essentially individual
cases.""
6
The Committee's suggestion was followed: Section 2 10111 pro-
vides in part as follows:
(1) Any member of a company who complains that the
affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner op-
pressive to some part of the members (including himself)
... may make an application 'to the court by petition for an
order under this section."
8
(2) If on any such petition the court is of opinion-
(a) that the company's affairs are being conducted as
aforesaid; and
(b) that to wind up the company would unfairly preju-
dice that part of the members, but otherwise the
facts would justify the making of a winding-up
order on the ground that it was just and equitable
that the company should be wound up;
the court may, with a view to bringing to an end the matters
complained of, make such order as it sees fit, whether for
regulating the conduct of the company's affairs in future,
or for the purchase of the shares of any members of the com-
pany by other members of the company or by the company
and, in the case of a purchase by the company, for the re-
duction accordingly of the company's capital, or otherwise."
During the first nine years that Section 210 was on the books, no
115 Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (H.M.S.O., 1945, Cmd.
6659), para. 60, as quoted in Peppiatt, Statutory Protection of Minority Shareholders in
English Limited Companies, 14 Bus. Law. 621, 631 (1959).
116 Ibid.
117 English Companies Act, 1948, § 210.
118 The omitted material gives the Board of Trade also the right under certain
circumstances to make such an application.
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shareholder succeeded in obtaining the court's assistance under it;
although the possible availability of relief or perhaps threats to resort
to the section may in many instances have tempered majority action.
In the Scottish case of Elder v. Elder & Watson,119 decided in
1952, the court refused relief under Section 210 to petitioning share-
holders on facts illustrating what is (in the United States at least)
the most frequently used of the squeeze-out techniques, namely, the
exclusion of minority shareholders from office and employment in the
company. The company involved in that case had been brought into
existence by the incorporation of a two-man partnership. At the time
of the action under Section 210 the company had twelve shareholders,
all descendants of the original partners. The company had a three-
man board of directors; the two petitioners were members of the
board. The trouble started when one of the petitioners got into a
violent quarrel with his brother, the third man on the board of direc-
tors. The brother thereafter persuaded holders of a majority of the
shares to join with him in removing the petitioners as directors and
in forcing their retirement or dismissal as secretary and factory mana-
ger respectively. Some time later petitioners tried to sell their shares
to the company and its new directors, but their proposals were
rejected.
Petitioners then resorted to Section 210, seeking an order for
the purchase of petitioners' shares by the company at a stated price
or at a price to be fixed by the court. The court dismissed the petition.
Section 210 applies to oppression of members of a company in their
character as shareholders: removal of shareholders from the director-
ate and from corporate offices and employment does not affect their
interests as shareholders; and mere refusal of the directors to buy a
member's shares is not oppression. There was no averment that the
business had been or was being mismanaged. Thus the affairs of the
company had not been conducted in a manner oppressive to part of
the members. Furthermore, another condition to relief under Section
210 had not been met: under that section the court can act only if a
winding-up order would be "just and equitable, '120 and in this case
the facts did not justify winding-up. Lord President Cooper com-
mented: "Where the 'just and equitable' jurisdiction has been applied
119 1952 Sess. Cas. 49.
120 The Draft Companies Bill for the State of Israel, § 151 (1957) provides as
follows: "Any member of the company who considers himself oppressed by the conduct
of the affairs of the company, may apply to the court, and the court may make such
order as it thinks fit, whether for regulating the conduct of the company's affairs or
for the acquisition of the applicant's shares by others or by the company, or otherwise,
except an order for the winding-up of the company." Apparently this section gives the
court power to grant other relief irrespective of whether a winding-up would be "just
and equitable."
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in cases of this type, the circumstances have always, I think, been
such as to warrant the inference that there has been, at least, an
unfair abuse of powers and an impairment of confidence in the probity
with which the company's affairs are being conducted, as distinguished
from mere resentment on the part of a minority at being outvoted
on some issue of domestic policy."' 21 Later he went on to say, "I
do not think that a 'just and equitable' winding-up has ever yet been
ordered merely because of changes effected in the board of directors
or the dismissal of officers, and very strong grounds would be needed
to justify such a step." '122
The opinions in the Elder case indicated that Section 210 is in-
deed rather narrow in application and is not available for use in some
of the most common dissension and deadlock situations. Thus Lord
President Cooper commented that "the new remedy is not lightly to
be accorded."'2 Lord Keith, referring to the types of cases to which
Section 210 applies, stated: "Mere loss of confidence or pure deadlock
does not, I think, come within Section 210."1'24 At another point in his
opinion he remarked that Section 210 did not suggest to him "that it
includes mere domestic disputes between directors or members or
lack of confidence between one section of members and another sec-
tion in matters of policy or administration."'120
Two cases decided in 1958, however, showed that Section 210
can be used to advantage in some dissension and oppression situations.
The first case under Section 210 to reach the House of Lords, and
also the first case in which the petitioning shareholder obtained relief
under Section 210, was Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soc'y v. Meyer.2 '
In that case, a co-operative wholesale company (hereafter referred to
as the "society") and two textile experts, Meyer and Lucas, organized
a company to process and sell rayon materials. The society supplied
most of the capital for the company, and Meyer and Lucas furnished
the formulae, experience and trade connections. Something over half
the stock issued was allotted to the society and the remainder to
Meyer and Lucas. Of the company's five directors, three were nomi-
nees of the society; Meyer and Lucas were the other two.
The new company became in effect a marketing subsidiary of
the society. Meyer and Lucas, through their European connections,
bought supplies of yarn, which were paid for by the society. The
yarn was then processed and woven into cloth at one of the society's
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mills, which had not previously been used for the manufacture of
rayon cloth. The cloth was then sold to the new company and by it
dyed,-finished and resold.
The new company's affairs prospered until, after a quarrel be-
tween the society's managers and Meyer and Lucas, the society
formed a department to process and sell rayon cloth and adopted a
policy of withholding cloth from the company except at uneconomical
prices. Thereafter, the society's board of directors refused an offer
of Meyer and Lucas to sell their shares at a negotiated price, recording
in their minutes (this was not communicated to Meyer and Lucas)
that the company had served its purpose and should be liquidated.
The society's nominees on the company's board passively supported
the society's decision to bring about the company's liquidation; they
did nothing to prevent the company's business from declining.
Meyer and Lucas petitioned for relief under Section 210, and
the court ordered the society to purchase their shares at a figure fixed
by the court. The society appealed, and the House of Lords dismissed
the appeal, holding that the society's conduct was oppressive and that,
although complaining shareholders could only bring themselves within
Section 210 by proving that the affairs of the company in which they
held shares were being conducted in a manner oppressive to share-
holders, the facts that the company was the society's subsidiary and
the society's nominees on the company's board were participating in
the society's oppression and passively neglecting the company's in-
terests, rendered the conduct of the society and its nominees oppressive
conduct of the company's affairs within the meaning of Section 210.
In that connection, Lord Keith commented: "Misconduct in the
affairs of a company may be passive conduct, neglect of its interests,
concealment from the minority of knowledge that it is material for
the company to know."' 27 The House of Lords also indicated that
whenever a subsidiary company is formed with an independent mi-
nority of shareholders, the parent company is subject to an obligation
to deal fairly with the subsidiary. Finally, the House of Lords found
no fault with the court's fixing of the transfer price of the shares: the
price was properly fixed at the value they would have had if it had not
been for the oppressive conduct.
The other 1958 case applying Section 210 was Re H. R. Harmer,
Ltd.,128 decided by the Court of Appeal. "Truly lamentable litigation,"
remarked Jenkins, L.J.,'9 of the suit by two shareholders asking for
relief under Section 210 from the high-handed and oppressive conduct
of their eighty-eight-year-old father. The father had founded a
127 Id. at 35.
128 [19581 3 All E.R. 689 (CA.).
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stamp business and had operated it successfully for many years.
Eventually he incorporated it, giving to his two sons most of the non-
voting shares, which carried the major beneficial interest in the com-
pany, i.e., liquidation rights and rights to divisible profits, but re-
taining for himself and his wife most of the voting shares, which
carried no right to participate in profits. The father and the two sons
were all life directors of the company; in addition, the company's
articles designated the father governing director but did not define the
powers of the governing director or reduce the powers of the other
directors.
The father perhaps believing that his voting control entitled him
to run the business just as he had before incorporation, assumed
powers he did not have, disregarded resolutions of the board of di-
rectors, and in general interfered autocratically in the company's day-
to-day affairs. Among other things, he opened a branch in Australia
without authority, procured the appointment of directors whom he
expected to vote as he directed, dismissed employees summarily, and
told a prospective employee that one of the sons was "wrong in the
head" and would not be with the company much longer. The peti-
tioners asked for the following relief under Section 210: (1) a change
in the company's regulations to confer voting rights on the nonvoting
shares; or (2) an order requiring the father to sell his shares or at
least his voting shares to petitioners; and (3) removal of the father
from his office as director and alteration of the company's articles of
association accordingly, on the company's undertaking to pay to the
father and his wife such pension as the court might think proper; or
(4) whatever order would be just. It was not disputed that the facts
would justify a winding-up order under the "just and equitable" rule.
The court held that the petitioners had proved their case and
entered an order under Section 210, but (with the agreement of the
petitioners) not in the terms of the prayer in the petition. On appeal,
the Court of Appeal held that relief under Section 210 had been
properly granted. The affairs of the company had been conducted in
a manner oppressive to the petitioners as members, not merely as di-
rectors. Even if the father's acts might lawfully have been done
pursuant to formal authority from a general meeting, the petitioners
were entitled to insist that proper procedure be followed. The fact
that the sons had originally acquired the shares as a gift from the
father (if that were a fact) was irrelevant. Further, even if the sons
at the time they acquired their shares contemplated that the father
would retain control, it could not be assumed that they knew the
father would exercise that control irregularly and without giving any
effect to their own life directorships. Finally, if the father had gotten
no pecuniary benefit from what he did, his conduct would still have
OPPUGNANCY AND OPPRESSION IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS
been oppressive: "If there is oppression, it remains oppression even
though the oppression is due simply to the controlling shareholder's
overweening desire for power and control and not with a view to his
own pecuniary advantage."'
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RANDOM COMMENTS
American courts traditionally have been reluctant to interfere
in the internal affairs of corporations when dissension develops among
shareholders or even when minority shareholders claim that they have
suffered injustices. This refusal to review action by majority share-
holders or directors is generally based on the principle of majority rule
or on the business judgment rule.
Apparently without close examination, courts accord the princi-
ple of majority rule the same sanctity in corporate enterprises, in-
cluding small businesses, that it enjoys in the political world. The
principle of majority rule is in traditional legal thought a firmly
established attribute of the corporate form. Yet many participants in
closely held corporations are "little people," unsophisticated in busi-
ness and financial matters. Not uncommonly a participant in a closely
held enterprise invests all his assets in the business with an expecta-
tion, often reasonable under the circumstances even in the absence of
express contract, that he will be a key employee in the company and
will have a voice in business decisions. Thus, when courts apply
the principle of majority rule in close corporations, they often dis-
appoint the reasonable expectations of the participants.
The indiscriminate application of the business judgment rule to
sustain action of directors in close corporations is also ubject to
some criticism. That rule is perhaps grounded on the following ideas:
(1) the shareholders have selected the directors to manage the busi-
ness, and the courts are not justified in substituting their judgment
for that of managers selected by the owners of the business; (2) di-
rectors' decisions are based on complex business considerations and
courts are simply not qualified to make those decisions or to pass on
their propriety in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion; and
(3) a heavy burden should be placed on complaining shareholders to
discourage "strike suits" and frivolous litigation. These reasons for
the business judgment rule, however, do not apply in all their vigor
in a close corporation; and courts might well consider intervention to
protect minority shareholders in a close corporation against oppres-
sive action by the directors, even though fraud, bad faith or, for that
matter, clear unreasonableness on the part of the directors cannot be
shown. Participants in a close corporation do not usually think of
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themselves as delegating management of their corporation to an inde-
pendent board of directors. Owners and managers, insofar as the
participants look into the future, are to be the same. Minority share-
holders expect to share in management. A board of directors to them
is a legal formality. The minority shareholders have not actually
agreed to have the business managed unilaterally by directors chosen
by the majority. It hardly seems necessary in all cases to say, as the
courts so often have said in effect, that when a person becomes a share-
holder in a corporation, he assumes a status with all of its legally
built-in liabilities, irrespective of his and his associates' intentions
and expectations. Further, in a close corporation the business con-
siderations on which directors' decisions are based are likely to be
somewhat less intricate than in public-issue corporations, and the
directors making the decisions are likely to be in general somewhat
less astute; there is less reason for judges to show an unquestioning
deference to decisions the directors have made. Finally, the great
practical danger to a too-ready judicial interference in public-issue cor-
porations, the danger of "strike suits," is not present, at least not in
the same degree.
In spite of the principles of majority rule and the business judg-
ment rule, the courts in this country are moving steadily, though slowly
and often clumsily and gropingly, to provide a remedy for oppressed
minority shareholders. They are doing that principally by imposing
a fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders and corporate directors
for the benefit of minority interests, and by gradually expanding the
scope of that fiduciary duty.
Perhaps in imposing this duty the courts are simply applying the
ethical standards of the business community. It is interesting to
note that the British also fallback on fundamental notions of fairness
and justice in deciding when to come to the aid of minority share-
holders. Thus Lord President Cooper, in Elder v. Elder & Watson,13'
in considering what classes of cases Section 210 of the English Com-
panies Act was intended to cover, commented that "the essence of the
matter seems to be that the conduct complained of should at the lowest
involve a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing, and a
-violation of the conditions of fair play on which every shareholder
-who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely."
As the ethical standards of the American business community
have progressed far since the "robber baron" days when it was just
good business to squeeze out a competitor or an associate, and as
they give every indication of further advances, American courts are
quite likely -to broaden the classes of cases in which they will inter-
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fere to aid oppressed shareholders. In an age when small businessmen
hear "brotherly love" speeches in their civic clubs at least once a
year, most of the squeeze-plays heretofore used to eliminate business
associates can hardly be considered "cricket." Perhaps in the not too
distant future American courts will uniformly insist that majority
shareholders refrain from any conduct which can reasonably lead to
the inference that they are ignoring the interests of other shareholders
or are using their majority powers other than in the interests of the
company as a whole. And eventually the courts may even impose
some duties on minority shareholders, e.g., that they refrain from
spiteful conduct that harms the business and that they avoid acting
in ways that make it impossible for the majority to cooperate with
them.
Whatever action courts now or in the future may take on behalf
of "oppressed" shareholders, there will probably always be some un-
happy shareholders who cannot get relief. Courts are not likely, for
instance, to give satisfaction to a minority shareholder who simply is
being outvoted on matters of policy on which he has strong convic-
tions, or who has over a period of time lost confidence in the business
ability of the controlling shareholders and the directors and officers
they select. Thus, irrespective of progress being made in protecting
shareholders against oppression, a person entering a closely held
enterprise as a minority shareholder, if he is well informed, may
still want special charter or by-law provisions or some kind of con-
tractual arrangement which will give him a voice in management
(perhaps a veto over corporate decisions), assure him employment
with the company at a salary commensurate with that of majority'
shareholders, and provide for the settlement of disputes that may arise
among the participants. The doubt which exists in many jurisdictions
on the validity of such charter and by-law provisions and contractual
arrangements should be removed by clear statutory authorization.
There is simply no justification, for instance, in refusing to give full
effect to a contract among businessmen for the arbitration of disputes
(including disputes on management and policy questions) which may
in the future arise out of the operation of their business.
American legislators and judges should watch carefully Eng-
lish experience in the application of Section 210 of the Companies
Act, not only to observe the types of cases to which the section is
applied but also to see what kinds of remedies the English courts
give and the success they have with them. Section 210 expressly
says that the court may "make such order as it sees fit, whether for
regulating the conduct of the company's affairs in future, or for the
purchase of the shares of any members of the company by other
members of the company or by the company .... " This section cer-
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tainly seems to confer on the English courts much broader remedial
powers than our courts have ever exercised. The suggestion has
been made that in some circumstances the court in applying the section
might give voting rights to holders of nonvoting shares; 18 2 and as a
matter of fact, a court might undertake to rearrange the whole share
structure of the corporation.
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